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Littering is a commonplace phenomenon that affects every person, almost
everywhere. From reports and writings we know that littering defaces moun-
tain trails, alpine meadows, and even our highest peaks. Those in the valleys
are often almost inundated with litter. Where a river is polluted and a person
is dependent on it for drinking water, I suppose there would not be the
slightest doubt that he would have standing in court to present his claim. I
also suppose there is not the slightest doubt that where smog settles on a
city, any person who must breathe that air or feel that sulphuric acid forming
in his eyes, would have standing in court to present his claim. I think it
equally obvious that any resident of any area whose paths are strewn with
litter, whose parks or picnic grounds are defaced by it has standing to tender
his complaint to the courts. 2
I. INTRODUCTION
Feeling that his environment is being destroyed and that he can do
nothing about it may be one of the most frustrating experiences for a citizen.
Adding to that frustration is the fact that frequently the source of the pol-
lution is a large corporation which has far more resources, financially and
1. The Lorax is a character in The Lorax, by Dr. Seuss. That story is the
basis for some of the discussion in this Comment. See infra notes 7-13 and accom-
panying text.
2. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedure
(SCRAP), 41t U.S. 669, 703 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
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politically, than the environmentally conscious individual. In this unequal
match the federal government has given to the citizen David a slingshot
against the polluting Goliath-the federal environmental statutes.
The various federal statutes cannot slay every polluter, however, as writ-
ten, they provide very comprehensive pollution protection. There are statutes,
preventive and remedial, protecting the water, the air, and the land from
liquid, solid, gaseous, and noise pollutants. The federal statutes generally
provide for citizen involvement at the planning stage of projects and licensing,
as well as for citizen suits to remedy pollution violations or to force agency
action regarding a pollution issue.
Although the federal statutes are broad in scope, there are some limi-
tations on the jurisdiction of the federal agencies and on the effectiveness
of the federal statutes in various situations. Thus, in fighting pollution the
citizen may need to seek recourse from the state pollution laws3 and common
law theories such as nuisance and trespass.
Environmental law and environmental remedies are large topics.4 This
Comment is intended to provide an overview to introduce the general prac-
titioner to environmental law and to aid her in recognizing causes of action
and the remedies available. To further this goal I have tried to set out some
of the limitations on the usefulness of each remedy so as to illustrate how
to utilize the federal statutes most effectively. While much of the discussion
deals with these limitations, I do not want to suggest that it is bleak for the
citizen. The remedies work, as the number of citizen suits filed annually
indicates. The first part of this Comment introduces the law and the second
part applies the law to a specific hypothetical situation. Because the case law
is so voluminous and varied, I have chosen to present some of the discussion
in terms of The Lorax, by Dr. Seuss,6 a narrative of an industrialist, the
Once-ler, recounting with the benefit of hindsight both the environmentally
disastrous results of his actions and the Lorax's unsuccessful attempts to
protect the land.
In The Lorax, By Dr. Seuss,7 the Once-ler describes how he came into
a land resplendent with animals, birds, and fish living among lush vegetation,
fresh air, and clear, bountiful lakes. This paradise inspired in the Once-ler
3. Each state's environmental statutes and agencies vary. Any discussion of
state enforcement mechanisms in this Comment will focus on Missouri. See generally
Vanderveldon, Is the State Environmental Act an Endangered Species?, CAI. LAw.,
April 1984, at 45.
4. See generally GOVERNMENTAL HANDBOOK, ENvmoNMiNTAL LAW HAND-
BOOK (8th ed. 1985).
5. See Fadil, Citizen Suits Against Polluters: Picking Up the Pace, 9 HARv.
ENVTL. L. REv. 23 (1985).
6, T. GEISEL, THE LoRAX, BY DR. SEuss (1971).
7. Id. The pages in the book are not numbered. Thus this and the following
footnotes do not indicate pages.
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a vision; a vision of a manufacturing empire based on thneeds produced
from the tufts of the Truffula Trees that covered the land. The Once-ler's
pursuit of his vision-the building of his factory, the felling of the trees,
and the processing of his needs-polluted the land. The Brown Bar-ba-loots,
who ate Truffula fruits, were "all getting the crummies because they [had]
gas, and no food, in their tummies!"; 8 the "emogulous smoke" was so bad
that the "poor Swommee-Swans ... why, they [couldn't] sing a note! No
one can sing who has smog in his throat"; 9 and the "Gluppity-Glupp" and
"Schloppity-Schlopp" was "glumping the pond where the Humming-Fish
hummed! [so that] No more [could] they hum, for their gills [were] all
gummed." 0
The Lorax, who "speak[s] for the trees, for the trees have no tongues,""
approached the Once-ler several times, attempting to abate the destruction
of the environment. But the Once-ler only "yelled at the Lorax, 'Now listen
here, Dad! All you do is yap-yap and say, 'Bad! Bad! Bad! Bad!' Well, I
have my rights, sir and I'm telling you I intend to go on doing just what I
do!"".12 And he did. The Once-ler did not stop until the last Truffula tree
was chopped down and there were no more tufts from which to make thneeds.
When the Once-ler finished, he had turned an area once alive with vegetation
and wildlife into a desolate area where now only "grickle-grass"I 3 could
grow.
II. TBm FEDERAL STATUTES
The federal government in the last twenty years has become increasingly
involved in legislating protection of the environment.' 4 The contemporary
federal policy of protecting the environment was first expressed in the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). 15 However, the Refuse
Act 6 in the Rivers and Harbors Act of 189917 has also been used to protect
the environment. As expressed in NEPA and the other acts, the purpose of







14. See generally Belsky, Environmental Policy Law in the 1980's: Shifting
Back the Burden of Proof, 12 EcOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1984); Environmental Crimes, 22
AM. CRa .L. REv. 373 (1985).
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1982).
16. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1982), Rivers and Harbors Act § 13.
17. 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-467e (1982).
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ment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man. '" 8 The
environmental statutes designed to preserve the environment include the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 19 the Clean Water Act
(CWA), 20 the Clean Air Act of 1970 (CAA),21 the Safe Drinking Water Act, 22
the Toxic Substances Control Act, 23 the Noise Control Act of 1972,24 the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA),25 the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 26 the Endangered Species Act of
1973,27 and the Marine Mammal Protection Act. 28 There are also statutes
designed to clean-up those existing residues of pollution that continue to pose
a hazard to the environment, such as Superfund 29 and the Surface Mining con-
trol and Reclamation Act (SMCRA)3° for cleaning up abandoned mines.
A. The Rivers and Harbors Act
The Rivers and Harbors Act was designed to insure federal control of
the navigable waters of the United States. At the time the Act was passed
in 1899, the federal government's interest was in maintaining the navigability
of the federal waterways, not in keeping them pollution free.3 One way that
navigability can be hindered is by the blocking or filling of the waterway by
refuse, and such actions are prohibited by the Refuse Act, section 13 of the
18. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 2; 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1982)
[hereinafter NEPA] (Congressional declaration of purpose); see also id. § 7410(b)
(1982), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982), 42 U.S.C. § 4910(b) (1982).
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1982).
20. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982). When originally passed, the Act was
known as the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), but since the Clean
Water Act Amendment of 1977, it has been referred to as the Clean Water Act. For
convenience I will refer in this Comment to 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982) as the
CWA.
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982).
22. Id. §§ 300F-300J.
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982).
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-4918 (1982).
25. Id. §§ 6901-6987. "The objectives of this chapter are to promote the
protection of health and the environment and to conserve valuable material and energy
resources .... " Id. §§ 6902.
26. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1982).
27. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982).
28. Id. §§ 1361-1407.
29. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982) is known as Superfund and provides
a system and fund for cleaning up hazardous waste.
30. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982).
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Rivers and Harbors Act.32 The literal wording of the Refuse Act prohibits
any discharge of refuse into navigable water. Sewerage discharge, however, is
expressly exempted. The scope of the prohibition has been extended somewhat
by the courts to include, for example, liquid waste3 and oil floating in the
water. 4 Consequently, the Act has provided the statutory basis for water pollu-
tion complaints. 35
For the purposes of the Rivers and Harbors Act the term "navigable
waters" is defined by The Daniel BaP 6 test as those waterways which are
navigable in fact, historically or presently, or are susceptible with reasonable
improvement to navigation, 37 and on which that navigability makes interstate
travel possible. Thus, isolated bodies of water or those that flow only within
one state are not within the scope of the Rivers and Harbors Act. 31 While
the Rivers and Harbors Act can be used against violators, there is no citizen
suit provision and there is no private right of action implied on behalf of
those injured by violation of the Act. 9 A private right of action will be
implied from a statute only when the plaintiff is a member of the class for
whose benefit the statute was enacted, when there was legislative intent to
create a private right of action, and when the cause of action is not one
traditionally reserved for the states. 40 The Supreme Court has held that the
Rivers and Harbors Act is a general ban with "no implication of an intent to
confer rights on" any group.4 1 There is the theoretical possibility of a Qui
Tam action,42 under which the citizen acts as an informant to get the gov-
ernment to bring suit. However, the lower federal courts have consistently
32. Section 13 is also known as the Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1982) ("It
shall not be lawful to throw, discharge, or deposit... any refuse matter of any kind
or description ... into any navigable water of the United States .... )."
33. United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960).
34. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966).
35. See, e.g., United States v. Rohn & Haas Co., 500 F.2d 167 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1974); United States v. American Cyanamid Co., 480
F.2d 1132 (2d Cir. 1973). See generally Note, Environmental Law-Private Remedies
for Pollution of Navigable Waters, 50 N.C. L. REv. 153 (1971).
36. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557 (1870).
37. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
38. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982).
39. California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 292-98 (1981); City of Evansville
v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979) (no implied right of
action under section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act.)
40. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 293.
41. Id. at 294.
42. Qui tam pro domino rege is translated as "who sues on behalf of the
King as well as for himself." Annotation, Right of Private Party to Maintain Qui
Tam or Other Action for Enforcement of Provisions of Rivers and Harbors Act of
1899 (33 U.S.C. § 407, 411) Making it Unlawful to Deposit Refuse in Navigable
Waters and Their Tributaries, 15 A.L.R. FED. 636, 640 n.6 (1973).
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held that as to the Refuse Act the private individual can only inform and
not actually bring suit.43
If the lake in which the Humming-Fish hummed is an isolated body of
water, the Rivers and Harbors Act will not provide a remedy for the Lorax.
Relief will be available under section 13 only if the lake is navigable and if
the Lorax can convince the Corps of Engineers or Coast Guard44 to enforce
the Act. However, even if the Lorax convinces the federal government to
intervene, the continuous dumping will not be stopped under the Rivers and
Harbors Act because the CWA has limited the effectiveness of the Refuse
Act to incidents of non-continuous one-time dumping, whether deliberate or
accidental. 4
B. NEPA
In comparison to the Rivers and Harbors Act the language of NEPA46
is broad: "The Congress recognizes that each person should enjoy a healthful
environment, ' 47 To further that goal NEPA requires that an Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS) be prepared for "major federal actions48 significantly
affecting"9 the quality of the human environment. '50 When an EIS is re-
43. Connecticut Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., 457 F.2d 81, 84
(2d Cir. 1981); see also cases cited id. at 88. See generally Note, Qui Tam Actions
and the Rivers and Harbors Act, 23 CASE W. REs. 173 (1971).
44. When first passed, the River and Harbors Act was administered by the
Corps of Engineers. Now the Corps retains jurisdiction to issue permits; however,
the majority of the other environmental statutes are administered by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA). See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d) (1983) ("Except as
otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency ... shall administer this chapter.").
45. See 33 U.S.C. § 1371(b) (1982).
46. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§
4321-4370 (1982). A useful publication is D. MANDELKER, NEPA LAw & LrrAhmnE
(1984).
47, NEPA § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1982) (Congressional declaration of pur-
pose).
48. A federal action is any action involving the federal government; a major
federal action is one that requires substantial planning, time, resources, or money.
See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.C.
1972).
49. In Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S, 908 (1973), the court applied a two-part test of significant action that considers
both the extent and absolute qualitative adverse effects of the action on the environ-
ment.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). In relation to this clause, two tests have
been employed by the courts: the dual test and the unitary test. The dual test requires
both a major federal action and a significant impact; it would not require an EIS in
a situation where there was a significant effect but only a minimal federal action.
See NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 584 F.2d 619 (3d Cir. 1978). The unitary
1018 [Vol. 51
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quired, the agency proposing the major federal action must consider the
effect the proposed project will have on the environment.5 ' The environmental
factors are not controlling, however, they represent only one part of the
analysis.5 2 Still, if an EIS is not done or does not adequately deal with the
environmental issues, a citizen can file suit to force compliance with NEPA.
For example, in Calvert Cliff's Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. United
States Atomic Energy Commission5 3 a suit by a citizens' group elicited this
statement from the court: "Perhaps the greatest importance of NEPA is to
require the Atomic Energy Commission and other agencies to consider en-
vironmental issues just as they consider other matters within their man-
dates." 54
Although a proper EIS can be compelled, mere failure to comply with
NEPA will only delay, not stop, the proposed project. In his opinion, con-
curring in part and dissenting in part, in Kleppe v. Sierra Club15 Justice
Marshall notes that the standard remedy for an improper EIS has been an
injunction combined with an order to prepare a proper EIS. He argues that
"[t]his remedy is insufficient because, except by deterrence, it does nothing
to further early consideration of environmental factors. And as with all after-
the-fact remedies, a remand for preparation of an impact statement after the
basic decision to act has been made invites post hoc rationalizations." 56
Because NEPA requires only that the environment be considered, once
the agencies learned to write EISs that comply with the literal words of NEPA
and withstand procedural challenge, the effectiveness of NEPA as a citizen
tool was severely limited. In Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v.
Karlen5 7 the Court refused to override an agency decision about the location
of low-income housing in Manhattan holding that the purpose of NEPA is
standard, on the other hand, combines the two factors into one test. Thus, if the
impact is significant, the federal action does not need to be major. See Minnesota
Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974). The Council
on Environmental Quality adopted the unitary approach in 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18
(1985).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982).
52. See generally 40 C.F.R. § 1500 (1985) (procedural guidelines for preparing
an EIS).
53. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
54. Id. at 1112 (emphasis in original).
55. 427 U.S. 390 (1976). In Kleppe, the Sierra Club brought suit to compel
the Department of the Interior to prepare regional EISs for coal projects on the
theory that the Department was considering regional coal development. The Court
concluded that NEPA does not require an EIS prior to the time the action is proposed.
Id. at 398-402.
56. Id. at 415-16 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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to assure informed agency decision, not to dictate the decision itself.5 8
The goal of NEPA is to regulate federal sources of pollution. There is
no required EIS, for example, within the context of actions taken pursuant
to the Clean Air Act of 1970 (CAA) because the CAA is administered by
the states and thus is not a federal action. Similarly, actions by private parties
like the Once-ler are exempt. 9 Because NEPA's focus is procedural, not
substantive,60 in some situations the underlying requirements of the EIS exist
within the mandate of the substantive statute. Thus, for example, the EPA
Administrator is exempt from filing an EIS in relation to regulations and
permits issued under the Clean Water Act (CWA) because "no action of the
Administrator taken pursuant to [CWA] shall be deemed a major federal
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment .... "61
Exemptions from the requirement to prepare an EIS have been found under
a functional equivalence exception such as in Texas Comm. on Natural Re-
sources v. Bergland,62 where clearcutting was found not to require an EIS.
However, compliance with environmental requirements in the substantive
legislation does not automatically excuse the agency from preparing an EIS.
63
There is also no requirement of an EIS within the context of actions taken
pursuant to the CAA because the CAA is administered by the states, and
thus there is no major federal action. For NEPA to be an effective citizen
vehicle for deterring pollution, the EIS or the EIS procedure must be defec-
tive, the project must represent a major federal action that has not been
58. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resource Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (cannot solve environmental issues by challenging
procedure); Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 415-16 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) ("[A]s with all after-the-fact remedies ... preparation of an impact statement
after the basic decision to act has been made invites post hoc rationalizations.");
Citizen Advocates for Reasonable Expansion, Inc. (I-CARE) v. Dole, 770 F.2d 423
(5th Cir. 1985) (upon challenge EIS found adequate and decision left to agency
discretion).
59. NEPA applies to permits granted by the EPA; however, the underlying
action may make an EIS unnecessary. See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus,
627 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Winnebago Tribe v. Ray, 621 F.2d 269 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 836 (1980); Atlanta Coalition on Transp. Crisis v. Atlanta
Regional Comm'n, 599 F.2d 1333 (5th Cir. 1979) (EIS not needed as to decision to
fund state development plan); Rucker v. Willis, 484 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1973) (private
nature of marina).
60. In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), the Court held that it was within agency discretion to
deal with the issue of nuclear waste disposal one time rather than for each plant
construction permit. Vermont Yankee can be read for the proposition that NEPA is
a procedural, not a substantive, statute.
61. 33 U.S.C. § 1371(c)(1) (1982).
62. 573 F.2d 201 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 966 (1978).
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statutorily exempted, and the citizen must have standing because there is no
citizen suit provision. Just as there are limitations on the actions requiring
an EIS, there are restrictions on who may bring suit. In the case of a major
federal action in which an EIS is required under NEPA,64 there are provisions
for citizen involvement in agency decisions. 6 Although there is no explicit
citizen suit provision in NEPA, many citizen suits to require or question an
EIS have been successful when there is a showing of injury in fact." 1n
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedure
(SCRAP),67 the Supreme Court held that there is standing under NEPA to
challenge an agency action as long as there is an allegation of actual present
or future harm. 68 This harm need not be economic or physical69 and does
not need to be particular to the plaintiff.70 Before SCRAP the law of standing
for a NEPA action was that enunciated in Sierra Club v. Morton .7 In Sierra
Club the plaintiff, the Sierra club, objected to the development of the Mineral
King Valley on the basis of the position that it had in the community, as an
environmental group, without alleging individualized harm to any specific
person. The Court in Sierra Club held that the complaint failed for lack of
standing. In SCRAP, however, the plaintiffs alleged that they used the forests
which would be littered and lumbered in the wake of agency actions which
would hinder recycling efforts. Thus, the Lorax simply as the spokesman of
the trees, would have standing under NEPA to challenge the building of the
Once-ler's factory only as long as he alleged that he used the area and would
personally be harmed by the resulting pollution.
Just as it does not have a citizen suit provision, NEPA does not explicitly
authorize citizen intervention in enforcement actions. 72 While the SCRAP
test of standing represents an expansive view of standing, for a citizen to
intervene in an action brought pursuant to NEPA, he must satisfy the federal
rules of civil procedure for intervention, and the "test for intervention be-
64. See supra § II.A in text.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 4369(c) (1982): ("The reports provided for in section 5910
of this title shall be made available to the public for comment.").
66. See generally Comment, NEPA: Theories for Challenging Agency Action,
1982 ARiz. ST. L.J. 665.
67. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
68. Id. at 688-90; see also Annotation, Environmental and Conservation
Groups' Standing to Challenge Omission or Adequacy of Environmental Impact
Statement Required by § 102(2)(c) of National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42
U.S.C.S. § 4332(2)(c)), 63 A.L.R. FED. 446 (1982).
69. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 686.
70. Id. at 687.
71. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
72. In both regards, NEPA is far more restrictive than its more substantive
counterparts which tend to explicitly provide for both citizen suits and citizen inter-
vention. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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comes more stringent when the applicant for intervention is a subdivision or
citizen of a state and the state is already a party to the suit.""7a
If the Lorax cannot prevent the pollution under NEPA because the Once-
ler's factory does not represent a major federal action or because the EIS is
proper, then there is the possibility of enjoining the pollution under one of
the pollution specific statutes, such as the CAA or the CWA.
C. The Substantive Federal Statutes: CWA, CAA, and RCRA
"The objective of [the Clean Water Act] is to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 74 To
obtain this goal Congress has provided for both a federal75 and a state
permitting system. Upon approval by the EPA of the state's plan, the state
permitting system will replace the federal system. 6 The majority of states,
including Missouri,77 have EPA-approved clean water acts. The CWA applies
to all aspects of water pollution, including water storage for the purpose of
regulating stream flow, 7 sewage treatment,79 oil spills,80 toxic pollutants,"
pollution of lakes, 2 and thermal pollution." In dealing with pollution the
CWA requires the development of sewerage treatment plants 4 and provides
for grants to assist in that goal.85 Dischargers were originally required to
achieve by 1977 a level of clean up designated best practicable control
technology (BPCT), but the 1977 amendments to the act granted an extension
until 1984.86 BPCT represents the use of existing technology with a goal of
bringing water to a point of potability. However, new sources of pollution
are not controlled by the BPCT standards because they are not locked into
existing dated technology. 7 Rather they are controlled by the more rigid best
available control technology standards (BACT).88 Generally, the timetable
73. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Higginson, 631 F.2d 738, 739 (D.C.
Cir. 1979); see also Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania,
674 F.2d 970 (3d Cir. 1982) (affirmed denial of intervention by state legislators).
74. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982).
75. Id. § 1342(a).
76. Id. § 1342(c).
77. Mo. Pv. STAT. § 644 (1986).
78. 33 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1982). This does not include the control of dams.
79. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7641-7642 (1982).
80. 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1982).
81. Id. § 1317.
82. Id. § 1324.
83. Id. § 1326.
84. Id. § 1281(a).
85. Id. § 1281(g)(1).
86. Id. § 1311(b)(1).
87. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 121 (1977).
88. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2) (1982).
1022 [Vol. 51
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 4 [1986], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol51/iss4/4
ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIES
for achievement of BACT was extended in the 1977 amendments to the
CWA,89 and variances are available for a wide variety of reasons including
the cost of compliance and the type of pollution.90 Unlike the Rivers and
Harbors Act, for some purposes the CWA employs a more expansive defi-
nition of navigable waters which encompasses more than just the navigable
waters of the United States. For example, under section 404 of the CWA, 91
the Corps of Engineers has jurisdiction over the dredging and filling of
wetlands, areas that were not traditionally considered navigable. Thus, the
lake in which the Humming-Fish swim, as a wetland, is covered, and any
filling of the lake would have to be in compliance with a federal or state
permit. Similarly, if the lake is a public water system within the meaning of
the Safe Drinking Water Act, then there is the possibility of the Lorax filing
a citizen suit seeking a remedy for the deterioration of the community's
drinking water.92
One of the purposes of the Clean Air Act (CAA) is "to protect and
enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public
health and welfare and the productive capacity of its population ....- 93
This purpose is necessitated by the congressional finding that the increased
"amount and complexity of air pollution brought about by ... industrial
development... has resulted in mounting dangers to the public health and
welfare ... ."94 Congress also found that because of the nature of air pol-
lution, "the prevention and control of air pollution at its source is the primary
responsibility of States and local governments . . . . 95 Each state is required
to prepare a State Implementation Plan (SIP) which after approval by the
EPA is enforced by the state.96
For the EPA to approve the SIP it must be designed to achieve or surpass
national ambient air quality standards established by the EPA.97 If the state's
plan does not get EPA approval, the EPA is required to prepare one for the
state. 9 Thus the federal government is less directly involved with trying to
improve air quality than in cleaning up water pollution. 99 Although the two
acts are administered differently vis-d-vis the relationship between the federal
89. See American Paper Inst. v. EPA, 660 F.2d 954 (4th Cir. 1981).
90. Id. at 962-65.
91. 33 U.S.C, § 1344 (1982).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1982).
93. Id. § 7401(b)(1).
94. Id. § 7401(a)(2).
95. Id. § 7401(a)(3).
96. Id. § 7410.
97. Id. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i).
98. Id. § 7410(c)(1).
99. The CAA requires the state to develop a plan (SIP) which will be approved
by the EPA but administered by the state. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
The CWA allows for EPA administration of a federal plan unless there is a state
plan that has been approved by the EPA. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c) (1982).
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government and the state governments, the options available to the citizen
in each are similar. The CAA deals with all aspects of air quality: emission
standards for stationary sources'00 including standards for new stationary
sources,' 0 1 standards for the prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) of
existing air quality,102 standards for hazardous air pollutants, 03 standards for
ozone protection,0 4 and standards designed for the maintenance of visibil-
ity,"0 5 emission standards for moving sources, 0 6 and standards for noise
pollution.10n The state government or the Administrator of the EPA can sue
to enforce the permits. 08 If neither the state nor the federal agency takes
appropriate action, the CAA provides for the citizen to bring suit.' °9 The
"emogulous smog" pouring out of the Once-ler's factory is most likely in
violation of the ambient air quality standards set by the EPA, and thus the
Lorax, since no government agency has acted, could bring suit to bring the
factory within air quality standards. Under the CAA, however, he could not
prevent thneed production altogether. RCRA regulates the land disposal of
solid and hazardous wastes and imposes penalties for improper disposal."0
Thedefinition of solid waste in RCRA is broad, encompassing "garbage,
refuse, sludge ... and other discarded material, including solid, liquid, semi-
solid, or contained gaseous material .... "I" Excluded from this definition
are materials in "domestic sewage, . . . irrigation return flows ... [and]
point sources."" 2 In addition to regulating solid waste, RCRA deals with
hazardous waste management."' There are regulations applicable to gener-
ators,"14 transporters," 5 and operators of storage and disposal facilities." 6
If the Lorax is unable to prevent the Once-ler's factory from exceeding
federal and state pollution 16vels under either the CAA or the CWA, RCRA
could be used"17 if there is disposal of waste and if that waste is hazardous.
100. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7449 (1982).
101. Id. § 7411.
102. Id. §§ 7470-7479.
103. Id. § 7412.
104. Id. §§ 7450-7459.
105. Id. § 7491.
106. Id. §§ 7521-7574.
107. Id. § 7641.
108. Id. § 7411(c).
109. Id. § 7604.
110. Liquid waste disposal into the water is covered by the CWA. 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1376 (1982).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1982).
112. Id.
113. Id. §§ 6921-6934.
114. Id. § 6922.
115. Id. § 6923.
116. Id. § 6924; see, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Lamphier, 714
F.2d 331 (4th Cir. 1983).
117. See Environmental Defense Fund, 714 F.2d 331.
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From what the "gluppity-glupp" did to the gills of the Humming-Fish, it
can be hypothesized that it is hazardous waste.
Procedurally, the substantive environmental statutes are similar to each
other. Unlike the Rivers and Harbors Act and NEPA, most of the more
recent pollution-oriented statutes contain explicit citizen suit provisions." 8
These citizen suit provisions are very similar, providing that any person can
bring suit against any other person as long as the Administrator has not
initiated an action and the notice requirements are satisfied. Under the citizen
suit provisions, the Lorax would have standing to bring an action if the
regulations for protecting the air or the water have been violated by the
Once-ler because the "citizen suits provision reflected a deliberate choice by
Congress to widen citizen access to the courts, as a supplemental and effective
assurance that the act would be implemented and enforced." 1 9
The citizen suits provide that "any person may commence a civil action
on his own behalf"'1'2 "against any person ... who is alleged to be in
violation" of either the pollution limitations set by the statute or of an order
issued by the Administrator or State.' 2 1 A citizen may also bring suit against
the "[A]dministrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to
perform any act or duty ... which is not discretionary."' 2 Federal district
courts have jurisdiction over these actions to correct violations of the stat-
ute,1n3 while federal circuit courts have jurisdiction over actions seeking review
of any Administrator's actions.' 4
118. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1982); 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8
(1982); 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1982). See generally Annotation, Citizen's Action Under
33 U.S.C.S. § 365(a)(1) for Violation of Effluent Standards in Limitations under
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C.S. § 1251 et seq.) or Orders with
Respect Thereto, 68 A.L.R. FED. 701 (1984).
119. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 700 (D.C.
Cir. 1975). See generally Feller, Private Enforcement of Anti-Pollution Laws Through
Citizen Suits: A Model, 60 DEN. U.L. REv. 553 (1983); Harnish, The Self-help
Approach to Environmental Protection, Or, Power to the People Revisited, 86 DIcK.
L. REv. 647 (1982); Riesel, Environmental Suits by Citizens, ALI-ABA CoupsE MA-
TERIALs JoURNAL, October, 1983, at 53.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)'(1982) (CAA-"any person"); see also 33 U.S.C. §
1365(a) (1982) (CWA-"any citizen").
121. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (1982) (CAA); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1982) (CWA).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (1982) (CAA); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) (1982) (CWA).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1982) (CAA); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982) (CWA).
124. The CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (1982), reads "Review of the Admin-
istrator's action ... may be had by any interested person in the Circuit Court of
Appeals of the United States ..... " The CAA, in the comparable section, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7607 (1982), indicates only which court has jurisdiction, not who may bring suit;
however, the cases have interpreted the CAA to allow individuals to bring suit for
review of agency action. See, e.g., Council of Commuter Orgs. v. Metropolitan
Transp. Auth., 683 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1982) (review of agency action).
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A citizen is defined in the CWA as "a person or persons having an
interest which is or may be adversely affected,"' 12 and some cases have
interpreted both statutes as allowing citizen suits by any person. Others have
equated the citizen suit language requiring the plaintiff to have an "interest
which is or may be adversely affected" with the requirements in United States
v. SCRAP'2 for standing. 2 7 Although any citizen can have standing to main-
tain the suit, there must still be an allegation of a violation of the Act. 128
To bring suit the Lorax need only allege that the standards of the CAA or
the CWA have been violated and that he breathed the air or drank the water.
The purpose of the notice requirement is to allow the administrator or the
state agency to take action against the violation.2 9 Because the purpose of
the citizen suit has been held to be "to both goad the responsible agencies
to more vigorous enforcement of the anti-pollution standards and, if the
agencies remained inert, to provide an alternative enforcement mecha-
nism," 30 if there is official action, there is no need for a solely private action.
The citizen suits require that "[n]o action may be commenced ... prior to
sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of the violation"' 131 to the
administrator, the state, and the violator. 3 2 The courts are split as to whether
defective notice is fatal. At one end of the spectrum is a holding that "[t]he
notice requirement is not a technical wrinkle or superfluous formality...
[but is] ... part of the jurisdictional conferral from Congress . . . ,,133 At
the other is the opinion that "excessively restrictive construction ... is com-
pletely at odds with the announced purpose of the statute, which looks to
125. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (1982).
126. 412 U.S. § 669 (1973).
127. Montgomery Envtl. Coalition v. Costle, 646 F.2d 568 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(action against permit for discharge into the Potomac River).
128. Council of Commuter Orgs. v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 683 F.2d
663, 670-71 (2d Cir. 1982).
129. See generally Note, Notice by Citizen Plaintiffs in Environmental Liti-
gation, 79 MicH. L. REv. 299 (1980).
130. Student Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Fritzsche, Dodge and 01-
cott, Inc., 759 F.2d 1131, 1136 (3d Cir. 1985) (violation of CAA discharge permit)
(quoting Braughm v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215, 218 (3d Cir. 1979)); see also
Braughman v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215, 218 (3d Cir. 1979) (violation of Pa.
SIP); Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1976) (CAA), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 902 (1977).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (1982) (CAA); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1982) (CWA).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (1982) (CAA); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1982) (CWA).
133. Garcia v. Cecos Int'l, Inc., 761 F.2d 76, 79 (1st Cir. 1985) (RCRA action);
see also Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1985) (constructive
notice insufficient under CWA, RCRA, and CERCLA); Environmental Defense Funds,
Inc. v. Lamphier, 714 F.2d 331 (4th Cir. 1983) (RCRA); City of Evansville v. Ken-
tucky Liquid Recycling, 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979) (CWA suit dismissed), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980); Massachusetts v. United States Veterans Admin., 541
F.2d 119 (1st Cir. 1976) (CWA); City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681 (7th
Cir. 1975) (CAA), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 927 (1976).
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substance ... [not form] . . . to facilitate citizen involvement."'' 3 4
Because the purpose of the citizen suit is to elicit action from somnam-
bulant agencies, the citizen suit is barred "if the Administrator or State has
commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil action ... to require com-
pliance . . . .,,13 The Administrator's action will bar the private action if it
is "in a court of the United States or a State."' 36 But "court" as used in
the citizen suit provision has been held not to include administrative tribunals
because they do not have the "power to accord relief which is the substantial
equivalent to that available to the EPA in federal court .... -137 Although
the individual cannot bring a new action in the face of one by the Admin-
istrator, the Act provides that "in any such action ... any person may
intervene as a matter of right." '38 Even though the citizen can intervene, he
no longer needs to do so to insure that there is a suit, and thus his right to
attorney fees has been held to require a clear showing of a unique contri-
bution to the legal issues presented.139 Just as a citizen can intervene in an
action brought by the Administrator, the Administrator can, as a matter of
right, intervene in any citizen suit."40
The Lorax speaks for the trees, but environmental advocates have asked
why the trees cannot speak for themselves.' 41 In Palila v. Hawaii Department
of Land and Natural Resources,42 the Sierra club brought suit under the
Endangered Species Act in the name of the endangered species, the Palila
bird. The action to enjoin the use of the Palila's habitat for the grazing of
goats and sheep was successful because, under the ESA, harm includes deg-
radation of habitat and is considered an unlawful taking. 43 But under the
134. Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 175 (2d Cir. 1976) (CAA);
see also Pymatuning Water Shed Citizens for a Hygienic Env't v. Eaton, 644 F.2d
995 (3d Cir. 1981) (CWA, stayed action until notice for 60 days); Susquehanna Valley
Alliance v. Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor, 619 F.2d 231 (3d Cir. 1980) (CWA,
requirement of dismissal and refiling excessively formalistic), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1096 (1981); Natural Resource Defense Council v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79 (2d Cir.
1975) (CWA); Natural Resource Defense Council v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (CWA); Conservation Soc'y of S. Vt. v. Secretary of Transp., 508 F.2d 927
(2d Cir. 1974) (CAA), vacated 423 U.S. 809 (1975).
135. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B) (1982); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (1982).
136, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(1)(B) (1982); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (1982).
137. Braughman v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215, 219 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979); see also Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. Fritzsche
Dodge & Olcott, Inc., 759 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1985).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B) (1982); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (1982).
139. Alabama Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(c)(2) (1982); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2) (1982).
141. See Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 450 (1972).
But see Elder, Legal Rights for Nature - The Wrong Answers to the Right(s) Question,
22 OsoooDE HALL L.J. 285 (1984); see also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727
(1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
142. 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
143. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982).
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CWA or the CAA it is questionable whether the Lorax could bring suit in
the name of the Truffula Trees, Brown Bar-ba-loots, Swommee-Swans, or
Humming-Fish because they are not persons.
D. Federal Cleanup Statutes: Superfund and SMCRA
The CAA, CWA, and the other statutes dealing with specific pollutants
are directed at present regulation of pollution sources, not at the clean-up
of existing waste. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980,1" also known as Superfund,
is the federal response to the pouring of "Gluppity-Glupp" onto the ground,
providing a mechanism for insuring clean-up. By congressional order the
EPA has established a list of areas to be cleaned up, such as Times Beach,
Missouri. Unfortunately, the discovery of dump sites, now close to five
hundred, is proceeding at a rate far in excess of the clean-up rate. The polluter
can also be made to do the clean-up or at least pay for it. In United States
v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Co.,' 45 the clean-up of the
dioxin in Verona, Missouri, was litigated, and under a strict liability standard,
the defendants, including past and present owners of the site, were required
to reimburse clean-up costs.
Under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA),'4 6
mining is strictly regulated. Mine operators are required to return the land
to the condition it was in before mining, some types of mining are prohibited,
and money is set aside to reclaim old mines. While clean-up is a possible
avenue of recourse, the Lorax, as a citizen concerned for his environment,
undoubtedly prefers to prevent the destruction of the environment rather
than to try to repair it once it has been destroyed.
III. MissouRi E rmoNMmNTAL STATUTES
The CAA mandates that each state establish a State Implementation
Plan (SIP). In Missouri there is the Missouri Air Conservation Law'47 which
states:
It is the intent and purpose of this chapter to maintain purity of the air
resources of the state to protect the health, general welfare and physical
property of the people, maximum employment and the full industrial de-
velopment of the state ... through the prevention, abatement and control
of air pollution by all practical and economically feasible methods.'' 8
144. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982).
145. 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
146. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982).
147. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 643.010-.195 (1986).
148. Id. § 643.030.
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To meet these goals the "Missouri air conservation commission shall have
the authority to ... establish standards and guidelines to insure that the
state of Missouri is in compliance with the provisions of the federal 'Clean
Air Act' (42 U.S.C. section 7401 etseq.)."'149 State SIPs must meet the federal
standards, but those standards represent a minimum and nothing prevents
the states from imposing more stringent standards.' 10 In Missouri, however,
the "standards and guidelines. -. established [by the air conservation com-
mission] shall not be any stricter than those required under the provisions
of the federal Clean Air Act."' 5'
Although the Air Conservation Law preserves other existing remedies
and penalties, 52 it is more restrictive than the CAA in that it explicitly denies
any private citizen suits.'53 The courts, however, have granted standing to
private parties. For example, in Citizens for Rural Preservations, Inc. v.
Robinett, '4 the court held that a voluntary association had standing to chal-
lenge the quarrying of rock without a permit in Franklin County when the
resulting dust was contaminating the air. The court stated that the organi-
zation would have standing if seeking to vindicate its own rights or those of
its members. 5
The Missouri Clean Water Law156 established that "the public policy of
this state [is] to conserve the waters of the state and to protect, maintain,
and improve the quality thereof for public water supplies ... [and] ... to
provide that no waste be discharged into any waters of the state without first
receiving the necessary treatment.'1 5 7 This scope, as set out in the purpose
clause, has been limited somewhat by the definition given to discharge. In
State ex rel. Ashcroft v. Union Electric Co., 58 an action to enjoin Union
Electric from discharging cooling water in a manner that resulted in down-
stream dissolved oxygen levels below required levels was dismissed for failure
to state a cause of action, the court holding that too little dissolved oxygen
was not a discharge under the Clean Water Law.5 9 As with Missouri's Air
Conservation Law, there is no explicit citizen suit provision in the Clean
149. Id. § 643.055.
150. See EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426
U.S. 200 (1976) (federal projects required to meet more stringent state water control
standards).
151. Mo. REv. STAT. § 643.055 (1986).
152. Id. § 643.170.
153. Id. § 643.170(2).
154. 648 S.W.2d 117 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
155. Id. at 133.
156. Mo. Rav. STAT. §§ 644.006-.141 (1986).
157. Id. § 649.011.
158. 559 S.W.2d 216 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
159. Id. at 223. It should also be noted that this type of "discharge" is not
covered by the federal CWA either. See Mississippi Comm'n on Natural Resources
v. Coifle, 625 F.2d 1269 (5th Cir. 1980).
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Water Law. However, unlike the Air Conservation Law, there is no explicit
denial of private citizen suits. Other private nonstatutory remedies are not
abridged by the Clean Water Law,160 though the Clean Water Commission
has no power to consider those rights. In Curdt v. Missouri Clean Water
Commission,6' a landowner seeking review of a Commission order permitting
a utility's water purification lagoon argued unsuccessfully that allowing the
discharge from the lagoon was tantamount to allowing a tort. The court
wrote, "lilf Terre du Lac [the utility] is indeed violating the Curdts' alleged
riparian rights, then, Terre du Lac is not absolved from liability by its clean
water permit."1 62 The court went on to hold that while there might be liability,
the Commission has no authority to determine if riparian rights will be
violated by a purification system. 6 1
In the area of water pollution there are also on the books in Missouri
older public nuisance laws such as the Contamination of Streams Act, 164 the
Contamination of Water Supply Act, 165 and the Stream Pollution Act,'66 all
of which could potentially be used in innovative ways. Additionally, Missouri
has a statute designed to preserve open spaces in counties with populations
greater than 200,000,167 and one dealing with smoke emissions as nuisances,' 6
neither of which has a citizen suit provision. Thus, if the Lorax is in Missouri,
he will have as much, if not more, protection than he has from the federal
statutes alone.
IV. COMMON LAW
In City of Milwaukee v. Illinois'69 the Supreme Court held that there is
not a federal common law of public nuisance' 70 in the area of water pollution
because there is a federal statute, the CWA, under which a remedy is avail-
able.17' On this issue, City of Milwaukee v. Illinois is distinguishable from
the Court's earlier opinion on the same facts in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,
where the court held that there was a federal common law of nuisance. 72
160. Mo. REv. STAT. § 644.131 (1986).
161. 586 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
162. Id. at 60.
163. Id.
164. Mo. REv. STAT. § 252.210 (1986).
165. Id. § 577.150.
166. Id. § 250.230.
167. Id. §§ 67.870-.875.
168. Id. § 71.760.
169. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
170. Id. (no federal common law remedy of public nuisance available to plain-
tiff on parts of case); see Annotation, Federal Common Law of Nuisance as Basisfor Relief in Environmental Pollution Cases, 29 A.L.R. FED. 137 (1976).
171. 451 U.S. at 317-32.
172. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
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The Court, which had earlier found a federal common law even in the face
of Erie,'73 wrote in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois: "[When Congress addresses
a question previously governed by a decision rested on federal common law
the need for such an unusual exercise of lawmaking by federal courts dis-
appears."' 74 The converse can be inferred: in the absence of congressional
guidance the federal common law suggested in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee
exists. In the area of air pollution the Second Circuit in New England Legal
Foundation v. Costle'7t dismissed an air pollution action grounded in the
federal common law of nuisance, reasoning that there was an adequate rem-
edy at law (CAA) and thus no equity jurisdiction.
Although there is not a federal common law of nuisance, most of the
statutes explicitly do not abridge any existing rights such as the state common
law of public and private nuisance, trespass, and negligence. 176 A trespass
can be defined as anything that interferes with the plaintiff's possessory
interest in his property.17 A nuisance can be defined as an annoying, un-
pleasant or obnoxious thing or practice, 7 8 or a nontrespassory interference
with use or enjoyment of another's property. A negligence action arises if
173. Erie R.R. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
174. 451 U.S. at 314; see also Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National
Sea Clammers Assoc., 453 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1981). See generally Timbers and Wirth,
Private Rights of Action and Judicial Review in Federal Environmental Law, 70
CORNELL L. REv. 403 (1985).
175. 666 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1981); see also Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514
F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975).
176. Section 7604(e) of the CAA and section 1365(e) of the CWA both state:
"Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of persons)
may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent
[emission] standard or limitation or to seek any other relief [including relief against
the Administrator or a State agency]." 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (1982); 33 U.S.C. 1365(e)(1982); see Belsky, supra note 14, at 6-8 (discussing tort remedies).
177. Martin v. Reynolds Metals, 221 Or. 86, 90-94, 342 P.2d 790, 792-94 (1959)
(fluoride compounds carried by air onto plaintiff's property making it unusable for
cattle). Trespass in the environmental area represents an expansion of the concept of
trespass to encompass invasion by very small objects. See Annotation, Recovery in
Trespass for Injury to Land Caused by Airborne Pollutants, 2 A.L.R.4T 1054 (1980).
178. See, e.g., State ex rel. Renkin v. Harvey Aluminum, 226 F. Supp. 169
(D. Or. 1963) (fluorine from aluminum reducing plant damaged apple orchard);
Dresser Indus. v. Ruddy, 592 S.W.2d 789 (Mo. 1980) (en banc) (rupture of waste
settling basin polluting plaintiff's water supply); see Annotation, Right to Maintain
Action to Enjoin Public Nuisance as Affected by Existence of Pollution Control
Agency, 60 A.L.R.3D 665 (1974) (annotation dealing with enjoining public nuisances);
Annotation, When Statute of Limitation Begins to Run as to Cause of Action for
Nuisance Based on Air Pollution, 19 A.L.R.4T 465 (1982); Annotation, Modern
Status of Rules as to Balance of Convenience or Social Utility as Affecting Relieffrom Nuisance, 40 A.L.R.3D 601 (1971); Davis, Groundwater Pollution: Case Law
Theories for Relief, 39 Mo. L. REv. 117 (1974); Davis, Wells and Streams: Rela-
tionship at Law, 37 Mo. L. REv. 189 (1972); Davis, Theories of Water Pollution
Litigation 1971 Wis. L. REv. 738.
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the alleged polluter has not acted as a reasonable person would have.Y7 9
Nuisance actions brought by the individual can be private or public
nuisance actions. In public nuisance actions the only possible plaintiff is
usually a public official. For a private plaintiff to bring a public nuisance
action, he must allege not only the elements of the nuisance, but also that
he was harmed in a manner distinct from the general public, such as by
sustaining some personal injury or a distinct kind of property damage.' 80
Some cases have also held that before a plaintiff can bring a public nuisance
suit, he must exhaust all administrative (legal) remedies. 8 1 In a private nuis-
ance action the plaintiff must allege that the defendant has caused the an-
noying act and that there is substantial economic harm to the plaintiff.8 2
Under the private nuisance theory, plaintiffs have been able to recover for
groundwater pollution,' 83 airborne odors, 18 and other air and noise pollu-
tants. 8
A nuisance can cause either temporary or permanent damages. The type
of damages will determine when the statute of limitations begins to run and
the type of damages recoverable.18 6 A permanent nuisance is one that arises
from a permanent structure and permanently reduces the value of the prop-
erty, while a temporary nuisance is defined as one that is not constant or
unavoidable.'8 In establishing a remedy for a permanent nuisance, the courts
179. Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1985). See
generally supra note 35.
180. Diamond v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 374, 97 Cal. Rptr.
639 (1971). In that it requires the plaintiff to demonstrate a harm different from that
of the general public, a public nuisance action is more difficult to prove than an
action under NEPA in which standing is not denied just because many people suffer
the same harm. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedure
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973). See generally Annotation, Right to Maintain Action,
supra note 178.
181. State ex rel. Norvell v. Arizona Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 85 N.M. 165, 510
P.2d 98 (1973); see also Annotation, Right to Maintain Action, supra note 178.
182. Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523 (Ala. 1979); Bower v. Hog
Builders, Inc., 461 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. 1970).
183. State ex rel. Dresser Indus. v. Ruddy, 592 S.W.2d 789 (Mo. 1980) (en
banc); Bower v. Hog Builders, Inc., 461 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. 1970); Nelson v. C & C
Plywood Corp., 154 Mont. 414, 465 P.2d 314 (Mont. 1970); see also Comment, The
Law of Private Nuisance in Missouri, 44 Mo. L. REv. 20 (1979); Annotation, Land-
owner's Right to Relief Against Pollution of His Water Supply by Industrial or
Commercial Waste, 39 A.L.R.3D 910 (1971).
184. Ludlow v. Colorado Animal By-Products Co., 104 Utah 221, 137 P.2d
347 (1943).
185. See Annotation, When Statute of Limitations Begins to Run, supra note
178. (air pollution and nuisance actions).
186. See Goldstein v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 285 Md. 673, 404 A.2d 1064
(Ct. App. 1979); see also Annotation, When Statute of Limitations Begins to Run,
supra note 178.
187. Hillhouse v. City of Aurora, 316 S.W.2d 883 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958).
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often apply the comparative convenience doctrine, weighing the harm caused
by the nuisance against the harm in abating it.'
In State ex rel. Dresser Industries Inc. v. Ruddy,8 9 the Missouri Supreme
Court specifically held that the Missouri Clean Water Law does not preempt
nuisance actions, and that the pollution of the waters of the state constitutes
a public nuisance. 9° In that case the rupture of a dam in a settling basin in
Audrain County was held to be an actionable nuisance when the basin's
contents contaminated Buss Basin, Mill Creek, Big River, and Meramec
River.
However, without evidence that he owns property that is affected by the
pollution caused by the Once-ler's factory, the Lorax will be unable to sustain
a private action in trespass or nuisance. Absent any evidence that he was
injured in a manner different from the general public, the Lorax's best hope,
in the context of a common law remedy, would be to convince the local
government to bring a public nuisance suit.
V. RELIEF
The best avenue available to the citizen wishing to prevent the construc-
tion of a polluting source is through the administrative agencies. When there
is a major federal action for which an- EIS is required,' 9' NEA provides for
citizen involvement in the agency decision.192 Citizen groups have succeeded
in halting or completely preventing some projects because of defective or
nonexistent EISs. However, the effectiveness of NEPA as a tool for cleaning
up the environment is limited by its procedural nature, 193 which requires that
the environment be considered, but not be the controlling factor in an agency
decision. NEPA's effectiveness is further limited in that actions under the
CWA, the CAA, and other substantive statutes are not covered,' 4 and by
the discretion given to the agencies. 95
Although NEPA does not provide a vehicle by which pollution regulation
can be challenged, the substantive statutes provide for public comment about
proposed regulations.196 There is even the opportunity for a public hearing
188. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309
N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970) (operator of cement plant allowed to stay in business and buy
out those to whom it was a nuisance).
189. 592 S.W.2d 789 (Mo. 1980) (en banc).
190. Id. at 792-93.
191. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 57-78 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
195. 33 U.S.C. § 1371(c)(1) (1982).
196. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7474(b)(1)(A) (1982); id. § 7607(d)(3), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1313(c)(1) (1982); id. § 1342(a)(1).
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before the issuance of a permit to engage in a controlled act such as the
discharge of a pollutant into the water.197 Assuming that the Once-ler's fac-
tory is located in an area in which the CWA is in effect and where there
was already an approved SIP once the factory was contemplated, it might
be too late to influence the regulations, although they can always be revised.
If the permit issued to the Once-ler violates the statutory standards, then a
suit seeking review of the agency action would be possible. Such a suit is
brought in federal circuit court rather than district court, since it is a challenge
to the Administrator's action, not an attempt to compel him to act.198
The Lorax might be able to stop the building of the factory by convincing
the local zoning board to re-zone the land as noncommercial, or by per-
suading the local government to promulgate more restrictive pollution meas-
ures. Zoning as a method of environmental control has been discussed on a
theoretical level, but its practical utility is probably limited. 99 Zoning and
the promulgation of stricter pollution laws on the local, state, or federal
level might serve to prevent the building of a polluting edifice simply because
the better pollution devices required might make the project economically
unattractive. In addition to negotiating with government agencies the Lorax
can try to reach an agreement with the potential or existing polluter." Through
environmental mediation it might be possible for a mutually acceptable sit-
uation to be developed whereby the impact on the environment is minimized,
while the economic efficiency of the thneed business is maximized.
Once a source of pollution exists, NEPA is of no help. If the emission
violates, for example, RCRA, the CWA, or the CAA, 201 then an individual
can bring suit under the citizen suit provisions of the applicable act.202 In
bringing the suit the individual acts as a private attorney general and "Con-
gress made clear that citizen groups are not to be treated as nuisances or
troublemakers but rather as welcome participants in the vindication of en-
vironmental issues." 203 The citizen's actions can be directed at the polluter
to stop a violation of an environmental standard or of a permit issued pur-
197. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (1982).
198. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
199. See Kmiec, Environmental Inequities-Observations on Mandelker's En-
vironment and Equity-A Regulatory Challenge, 57 NonRE DAME LAW. 313 (1981).
200. Sviridoff, Recent Trends in Resolving Interpersonal, Community and En-
vironmental Disputes 35 ARB. J., Sept. 1980, at 3 (documenting negotiation of a
solution in the case of the Snoqualimie River basin dam where the dam was slightly
altered so as to maximize flood control for area farmers, Edelman and Walline,
Developing a Cooperative Approach to Environmental Regulation, 16 NAT. RE-
SOURCES LAW. 489 (1982) (documenting history of the consent decree achieved in
United States v. Homestead Mining Company (Civ. No. 78) (D.S.D. 1978).
201. This includes violation of the state SIP for air pollution or violation of
an approved state clean water act.
202. See supra notes 118 and accompanying text.
203. Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 172 (2d Cir. 1976).
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suant to one of the environmental statutes, or against the Administrator to
compel him to perform his nondiscretionary duties. The courts have con-
sistently held that the citizen's right under the citizen suit provisions of the
CWA and the CAA is to enforce the act, not to recover damages under it.204
Although the individual cannot recover damages in a citizen suit, the statutes
do provide for reasonable costs, and witness and attorney fees.205 The citizen,
however, must prevail on the merits.20 1 The statutes specify only that costs
can be awarded in the context of the citizen suit. Because of the underlying
policy similarities, however, attorney fees have been awarded for challenges
to Administrator actions.2
In addition to creating air and water pollution, the Once-ler's acts are
deleterious to the environment in other ways. Although the cutting of trees
on private land is not prohibited by any federal statutes, if the area into
which the Once-ler has come is federal land, then the Multiple Use Sustained
Yield Act of 196028 or the Forest and Rangeline Resource Planning Act of
1974209 might be applicable. The Forest Service and the Bureau of Land
Management control lumbering on federal land, and the Once-ler's decision
to cut down the Truffula Forest would be a major federal act necessitating
an EIS. If the Brown Bar-ba-loots, Swommee-Swans or Humming-Fish are
endangered species with no place else to go, the Endangered Species Act 210
will apply, and an EIS is required if their existence is threatened by a federal
action,21' Additionally, the noise being made by the factory can trigger the
Noise Control Act, 2 2 or subchapter IV of the CAA, which deals with noise
pollution, while the toxic quality of the waste213 is dealt with under the Toxic
Substance Control Act. 214
204. Noe v. Metropolitan Atlantic Rapid Transit Auth., 644 F.2d 434, 438-39
(5th Cir. 1981). But see Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island Nuclear
Reactor, 619 F.2d 231 (3d Cir. 1980) (citizen's suit provision preserves private cause
of action if persons can allege independent federal jurisdiction).
205. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (1982); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1982); see Annotation,
supra note 119.
206. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983) (interpreting section
307(f) of CAA).
207. Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park Comm'n v. United States, 711 F.2d 431,
436 (lst Cir. 1983) (court relied on purpose of the acts and congressional intent to
reject the American rule of no attorney fees).
208. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1982).
209. Id. §§ 1600-1687.
210. Id. §§ 1531-1543.
211. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
212. 42 U.S.C. § 4901-18 (1982).
213. See Quade, Pollution Boom, 69 A.B.A. J. 149 (1982) (toxic waste suits
expected).
214. 15 U.S.C. § 2601-29 (1982). Under the TSCA, the toxic waste is registered
and monitored while the RCRA regulates transport, storage, and disposal.
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If the statutory remedies are ineffective, the individual can bring suit
for a common law remedy. It is in stopping an existing source of pollution
that the common law remedies of nuisance and trespass are most effective
because when the pollution exists, the harm, source of the harm, and damages
can be proven and not just hypothesized. 2 - Although the common law actions
are largely curative and not preventive, their advantage is that it is possible
to get both an injunction to stop the pollution and monetary damages. 216
VI. CONCLusIoN
It is in trying to prevent offending pollution that a citizen, such as the
Lorax, feel the most frustrated. The Lorax ranted and raved at the Once-ler
and finally with a "very sad, sad backward glance ... he lifted himself by
the seat of his pants ... and took leave of this place, through a hole in the
smog, without leaving a trace. ' 21 7 Other concerned citizens have been known
to picket, engage in acts of violence, and even to send dead fish to corporate
executives. But while self-help may seem to be the only course available to
the citizen, there are other remedies depending upon the type of pollution,
status of the polluter, and status of the citizen. In the case of navigable
interstate waterways, the Corps of Engineers has jurisdiction under the Rivers
and Harbors Act, while the Clean Water Act and state clean water statutes
regulate the quality of the water and of pollution that could jeopardize that
quality. The Clean Air Act requires the states to regulate and control air
pollution towards the goal of cleaning the air, and there are statutes directed
at other aspects of environmental quality. The Lorax as a concerned citizen
has standing to enforce the Clean Air Act or the Clean Water Act, and if
he or his property is damaged by the pollution, he might have a common
law action for damages based upon a nuisance or trespass theory.
The environment is something that most people, including elected of-
ficials, feel very strongly about,218 and the assurances of citizen involvement
in the procedures mandated by the environmental statutes reflect that. While
there are remedies for abating or cleaning up pollution, they are minimized
215. Whether an injunction is issued is determined by a balancing of interests.
The interests of the individual trying to enjoin a polluter will be more compelling if
the evidence of the pollution is more than theoretical. There is, however, always the
possibility of enjoining an anticipatory nuisance.
216. Under the American rule, attorney fees generally will not be awarded
unless there is a statutory basis or strong evidence of congressional intent for that
award, such as is in the CWA and CAA.
217. T. GEISEL, supra note 6.
218. See Fadil, supra note 5; Sagoff, We Have Met the Enemy and He is'US,
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by jurisdictional and other requirements. Consequently, the best way for the
Lorax to have protected the environment would have been through political
and administrative channels, making sure that the regulations were stringent
and that they were enforced. 21 9
"But now," says the Once-ler,
Now that you're here,
the word of the Lorax seems perfectly clear.
UNLESS someone like you
cares a whole awful lot,
nothing is going to get better.
It's not.m
RHONA LYONS
219. See Drayton, Economic Law Enforcement, 4 HAv. ENvm. L. REv. 1
(1980).
220. T. GEISEL, supra note 6.
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